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Athens First

by July 1, 2019

By Van Bryan, Contributing Writer, Classical Wisdom
Reconstruction of Athens

Athens in its Golden Age

Recently, your editor asked a question…
Is nationalism “good”?
How interesting, we thought to ourselves. Immediately, hand went to chin. We furrowed our eyebrows in earnest ponderance.
Some questions stay with you, dear reader. Like a sore on the roof of your mouth that would go away if only you could stop tonguing it, but you can’t.
Today, we pursue the topic…
Classical Nationalism
The ancients had plenty to say on the topic of nationalism. After the Greco-Persian wars of the early fifth century, the unlikely expulsion of the Achaemenid Persian empire must have seemed like a miracle. Here, a plucky band of Hellenic tribes had expelled what was the reigning superpower of the ancient world.
Thermopylae… Leonidas… This is Sparta! All that.
Painting of Leonidas

“Leonidas at Thermopylae” by Jacques Louis David. All 300 Spartans along with the Helot slave warriors fought to their deaths. Persia won the battle, but lost the war.

A little chest-pumping was in order. And the idea of Greek superiority was established in the mind of the allies. After all, what could account for such a startling upset? Dumb luck? Superior planning? Arrogance and stupidity on the part of the Persians?
Negative…
As Aeschylus shows in his The Persians, the Greeks believed it was their piety that won the day. Their superior faith in the gods smote the Persians and drove them back across the Aegean.
Warriors on a shield

Greek and Persian warriors depicted fighting on an ancient kylix. 5th century BC. (Public Domain)

There misery waits to crush them with the load
Of heaviest ills, in vengeance for their proud
And impious daring; for where’er they held
Through Greece their march, they fear’d not to profane
The statues of the gods; their hallow’d shrines
Emblazed, o’erturn’d their altars, and in ruins,
Rent from their firm foundations, to the ground
Levell’d their temples; such their frantic deeds,
Nor less their suff’rings; greater still await them;

Need more evidence?

The term “barbarian” comes from the Greek word “barbaroi.” It literally meant a non-Greek.
Edith Hall writes in Inventing The Barbarian:

Greek writing about barbarians is usually an exercise in self-definition, for the barbarian is often portrayed as the opposite of the ideal Greek. It suggests that the polarization of Hellene and barbarian was invented during the early years of the fifth century BC, partly as a result of the combined Greek military efforts against the Persians.
In other words, the classical Greeks didn’t just believe themselves great. They believed themselves SUPERIOR to the “barbarian” tribes.
The 'Immortals'

Depiction of Persian warriors, most likely the Immortals.

Ah, but now the stage is set. Let’s return to your editor’s question. Is nationalism GOOD?
Athens First
Flash forward a few decades. It’s the late fifth century and the Athenians are engaged in bloody struggle, The Peloponnesian War. The opponent this time is the ignoble Spartans. After years of fighting, the Athenians are weary. Heavy losses have mounted.
Pericles, the foremost statesman of the era, prepares to give his famous funeral oration. The purpose of the oration is to honor the war dead. But it could be considered a eulogy for Athens herself.
Pericles, rather than praise the individual dead outright, heaps glory upon the city for which they died.
Writes Themistocles, quoting Pericles:
For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valor and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf.
Translation: sorry about your sons and husbands. But it was all for a good reason. Look at all our stuff! Now get back out there, champ.
Scene from the History of the Peloponnesian War

Pericles’ Funeral Oration was a famous part in “The History of the Peloponnesian War”.
Pericles’ Funeral Oration by Philipp Foltz (1852)

What patriotic hearts must Pericles have stirred to action? How many sons and husbands would take up the just and noble cause of polis. We don’t know precisely. But certainly the goddess Athena smiles up on the city that bears her name. She would see patriotic Athenians to victory. Right?
Not so much…
The Athenians would fall to the Spartans in 404 BC. Their walls would be torn asunder. Democracy, which the Athenians are credited as being the first to give it a go—would be suspended. The Spartans, had they wished, could have razed the city, killed the men, enslaved the women, and nicked all the imperial booty for themselves.
Fortunately, that did not come to pass. Athens would suffer under the tyrannical rule of the “Thirty Tyrants” for a time. But democracy was eventually restored. Life went on.

Vase depicting tyrannicide

But had the city been burned, the Athenians would have had only their vain nationalistic pride to blame…
Lies and Myths
To your editor’s question. Nationalism. Good? Bad?
Neither.

The nationalism of the ancient world was a convenient myth. Like the Olympians themselves, it could be neither proven nor disproven. The inherent greatness of Athens was neither true nor untrue. But it was useful. It was useful to Athenian generals and politicians who had a vested interest in expanding their fledgling empire into the Aegean immediately following the conclusion of the Greco-Persian war.
The imperial swag flooded the city from conquered nations. The status of well-placed Athenian elite was elevated with each conquest. And why not? The gods are with us!

Poseidon and Athena

Poseidon and Athena battle for control of Athens – Benvenuto Tisi da Garofalo (1512). ( Public Domain )

It’s not a new idea to say that a society tells itself myths. Plato was well aware of it.
Writes Plato in The Republic:
Thus it is that the stories we tell our children must be morally uplifting, and some of the myths are not. Therefore we must winnow the myths, editing them, and, in some cases, censoring aspects of them.
This idea is not even an ancient one.
Writes Yuval Noah Harari, author of Sapiens:
Large numbers of strangers can cooperate successfully by believing in common myths. Any large-scale human cooperation – whether a modern state, a medieval church, an ancient city or an archaic tribe – is rooted in common myths that exist only in people’s collective imagination.
The inherent greatness of the classical Greeks was a myth. It was an apparition that existed collectively in the minds of a people. Once you understand cultural mythmaking, you can’t not see it.
“Making the world safe for democracy” was a myth. So is “Workers of the world, unite!” So is MAGA.

The nationalistic myths of the Greeks allowed them to rally behind a cause and expel a foreign empire. But it also drug the Athenians and Spartans into an intractable war. A society’s ability for nationalistic mythmaking inspired the erection of the Parthenon. It also gave rise to Auschwitz.
Let us then return to your editor’s question.

Is nationalism “good”? No.
But it’s not “bad” either. It’s useful.
To whom? That’s for you to answer…

Pompey Needs a Buddy

by March 20, 2019

by Cam Rea, Contributing Writer, Classical Wisdom
Rome was expecting the Parthian invasion, but it never came. Instead, in the west, the Great Roman Civil War exploded, in the years 49 – 45 BC. It was a politico-military conflict which pitted Pompey against Caesar, each vying for leadership of the Roman state. It was during this time, that Pompey may have sought Parthian assistance, though one would think that Pompey would have wanted to avoid any type of assistance from Rome’s nemesis in the east, which recently had decimated Crassus’ army.
However, Pompey had no choice in the matter for he didn’t have the armies he once possessed. Instead, Pompey had the “senatorial and the equestrian order and from the regularly enrolled troops, and had gathered vast numbers from the subject and allied peoples and kings.” Essentially, Pompey had a quagmire of experienced and inexperienced forces all of which swayed in loyalty. Caesar, on the other hand, had the legions of the state, a battle harden and well armed professional fighting force of uniformity.
The odds were very much against Pompey.
Pompey face

ca. 1st century B.C. Bust of Pompey

Pompey’s military handicap and lack of wealth forced him to look for financial aid elsewhere in order to acquire additional forces. In the words of Plutarch, “Pompey had now to plan and act on the basis of existing circumstances. He sent messengers to the various cities, and sailed to some of them himself, asking for money and for men to serve in his ships” (Plutarch, Pompey, 76).
Of the many messengers Pompey sent, one of them visited Parthia. Pompey’s interest in seeking Parthian help was due to the fact that they were the, “most capable of both receiving and protecting [Pompey] them in their present weakness and later of helping them to build up their strength and sending them out to fight again with a large force.”
Map of Parthia

The region of Parthia within the empire of Medes, c. 600 BC; from a historical atlas illustrated by William Robert Shepherd

Pompey’s advisor Theophanes, however, suggested that Egypt was a safer bet, because the Ptolemies were indebted to Pompey for his kindness. If Pompey chose Parthia over Egypt, he would be playing second fiddle and at their mercy. Pompey likely had already made up his mind that Egypt was a safer bet, but decided to send an envoy to Parthia just to see. This visit to the court of Arsaces caused Julius Caesar to become suspicious, so much so that he mentions that, “it was hotly argued in their discussions whether Lucilius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompeius to the Parthians”
(Caesar, Civil Wars, 3.82).

Caesar knew that Pompey sent an envoy, but speculated as to who Pompey sent. Cassius Dio provides more detail into the matter:
“I have heard, indeed, that Pompey even thought of fleeing to the Parthians, but I cannot credit the report. For that race so hated the Romans as a people ever since Crassus had made his expedition against them, and Pompey especially, because he was related to Crassus, that they had even imprisoned his envoy who came with a request for aid, though he was a senator.” (Dio, 42,2)
Julius Caesar

Bust of Caesar

What Cassius Dio did not credit is whether or not Pompey considered political asylum if the situation turned bleak. However, even though that can’t be verified, it still does not negate the possibility. Moreover, Cassius was wrong about the Parthians hating the Romans. It is mentioned that King Orodes made it quite clear to Crassus that if this army was sent by the Roman people, it shall be a war to the bitter end. However, the ambassadors were smarter than that. They understood the difference between a nation declaring war and one man’s ambition.
As quoted above, Cassius Dio did mention that Pompey’s envoy, who happened to be a senator, was imprisoned. The unknown envoy may have been Lucilius Hirrus, something that was speculated by Caesar himself. According to Cicero, Hirrus was a lousy politician who spoke with a lisp and was the butt of Cicero’s jokes. He was described by the great man as a “would-be-noble.” Clearly, Cicero didn’t think highly of Hirrus.
Pompey's flight

The Flight of Pompey after Pharsalus, by Jean Fouquet

Additionally, Cassius Dio reports that the Parthians hated Pompey because he was related to Crassus. The fact that Hirrus happened to be a cousin of Pompey, may have been the reason for his imprisonment, but this seems unlikely.
What may have gotten Hirrus imprisoned (and into trouble with Orodes) was his “fatuous conceit.” In other words, once Hirrus arrived at the court of King Orodes, he quickly fell into disfavour. First, he laid out Pompey’s terms. Orodes evidently agreed with the terms and was willing to forgive and “promised to be his ally”… but on one condition. Pompey must hand over Syria.
This did not go over well with Hirrus, who spoke on Pompey’s behalf. Knowing full well that Pompey was not about to let go of his prosperous and strategic province, Hirrus likely insulted Orodes, which, in turn, led to his imprisonment.
Coin depicting king

King Orodes on a coin

However, this is mere speculation as there is no concrete proof Hirrus ever visited the court of Orodes. But one thing is certain; an envoy was imprisoned, not for his relation to Pompey, but likely for his demeanor during negotiations.
The news of the imprisoned envoy probably caused a stir among Pompey’s advisors and it may have prompted Pompey to unanimously choose Egypt as his place of operation. It is also understandable that he would choose Egypt over Parthia due to cultural similarities. Whatever the case may be, Pompey’s refusal was a potential game changer that could have saved his life and secured his place of power in Rome… for once Pompey stepped foot in Egypt, his life ended.
On the other hand, it is possible that had Pompey went to Parthia seeking financial and military assistance, he may very well have gotten what he needed to battle Caesar… or ended up being displayed as a trophy in the court of Orodes. However, Pompey went to Egypt where he was assassinated and Caesar rose to a higher, previously unseen level of power in the Roman Empire. Pompey’s alternative course in history, perhaps with the Parthians, was never realised.
Death of Pompey

Septimius (in armour) strikes Pompey from behind. 1880 illustration

After 300: The Posthumous Vengeance of King Leonidas of Sparta

by April 3, 2018

By Riley Winters, Contributing Writer, Ancient Origins
Mythologically descended from the hero Herakles, the Agiad dynasty of ancient Sparta reigned alongside the Eurypontids almost since the beginning of the city-state.
When war was on the borders of their land, and that of their neighboring city-states, it was to the current Heraklean descendent that those city-states turned. Even the Athenians, who were long-time rivals of the Spartan warriors, looked to the current Agiad king for guidance in the darkest time of the war.
That king, unsurprisingly, was King Leonidas I.
A King Amongst Kings
The better remembered of the two warrior-kings of the ancient Greek city-state Sparta, King Leonidas I lived and ruled between the 6th and 5th centuries BC. His time on the throne was short-lived, but his legacy has lasted lifetimes.
Leonidas is the king who many other kings aspire to emulate; King Leonidas gave everything to defend and protect his homeland. Called upon to lead the allied forces of the Greek city-states based on his military record alone, it is said that King Leonidas tried to protect his soldiers, ordering them to leave the battlefield to fight another day.
They did not, as one might guess, as they were Spartans; one way or another, Spartans return from battle—either with their sheilds, or on them, as the saying goes. Leonidas’ words of protection at the battle of Thermopylae fell on deaf ears, and the Greeks were slaughtered that fateful day in 480 BC.
Leonidas at Thermopylae

Leonidas at Thermopylae by Jacques-Louis David (Public Domain)

What happened after the massacre, however? What happened after the death of the one of the greatest military leaders? Without Leonidas, Sparta was down one king; it had been tradition for two kings to rule the city-state, one from each of the two primary families, the Agiads and the Eurypontids. With his death at the hands of the army of Xerxes, king of Persia, and his head paraded around on a spike, Sparta was left short-handed. What was the next step?
Revenge.
Image of Leonidas

Leonidas I of Sparta (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Wrath of the Gods
If one believes in the ancient Greek gods—as the city-states clearly did—it is impossible not to see the vengeance those gods encouraged through their mortal soldiers following the death of Herakles’ descendent. With the death of King Leonidas and the insult to his person, the Persians had essentially painted a bright red, divinely taunting target on their backs.
Over the next year, the Persians and Greeks engaged in their final land and sea battles, of which the Persians suffered as often as not. Salamis and Plataea, two of the most decisive Greek victories, officially turned the tide in favor of the Greeks.
In fact, a better vengeance could not have been written for King Leonidas. The Greeks, who had not forgotten the slaughter of Thermopylae, returned the favor in spades at the Battle of Plataea.
The Battle of Salamis painting

A romantic version painting of the Battle of Salamis by artist Wilhelm von Kaulbach. (Public Domain)

The ancient historian Herodotus (5th century BC) is one of the primary sources of this battle. Following a stalemate around the Persian camp constructed in Plataea, the Persians were unintentionally (though it was lucky for the Greeks) lulled into a sense of victory.
Having cut off the Greeks from their supply lines, the Persians believed the few Greeks who retreated to regain those connections represented the whole army; the subsequent Persian attack quickly proved them wrong. The Greek allies literally had the high ground, and a defeat of those Persian forces, led by Mardonius, was relatively swift. The Greek forces then, loosely interpreted from ancient texts, exacted their revenge for the slaughter of Leonidas and his men by massacring the Persian camp at Plataea. Later that afternoon, the Greeks finished the job at the final battle of Mycale.
Exacting Revenge
One could attribute this “retribution” as constructed by King Leonidas’ son Pleistarchus, intended to take the throne upon Leonidas’ death. Yet in an interesting turn of events, Pleistarchus was too young to rule at his father’s death, and the boy’s guardian Pausanias, was actually on the second Spartan throne.
Thus the decisive, somewhat brutal, actions against the Persians at Plataea and Mycale may or may not have been an act of vengeance in the name of the father Leonidas, but were almost certainly for the Herculean general who sacrificed everything for his home, and the homes of those allied with him.
(One should remember that Sparta and Athens were only on good terms when they were teamed up against Persia. They placed their animosities aside during the Persian War, Athenians willingly following Spartans, and Spartans trusting to delegate to Athenians. This alliance would crumble soon after the war, but Leonidas’ actions are even more inspiring for the prejudices put aside.)
Warriors on a shield

Greek and Persian warriors depicted fighting on an ancient kylix. 5th century BC. (Public Domain)

United States of Leonidas
King Leonidas’ sacrifice might not have resulted in the battle to end all Persian-Greek battles, however it did inspire a great deal of “nationality”, a concept not yet fully formed in the ancient world. Yet the Greek city-states saw a common enemy, and shared a common goal, and for a brief period of time, respected and valued the same man—homeland and culture aside.
The increased sense of unity Leonidas inadvertently forged between the Spartans, Thebans, Athenians, etc. led to an increased determination; the Greeks left no man standing at Plataea and Mycale if they could find one. The victory of the Greeks over the Persians resonated for centuries, and Leonidas’ name is remembered far better than those of the men who returned home with their shields rather than on them.
Because of this (and the later cockiness of the Athenians), the Spartans and their allies successfully defeated the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War, the next great battle on their horizon.

The Peloponnesian War Summary of Battles and Betrayals: Athens’ Last Stand

by October 22, 2017

The Peloponnesian War Summary of Battles and Betrayals: The Sicilian Expedition can be found HERE.
Peloponnesian key points

Key Points in the Peloponnesian War

The year is 413 BC and the battle between Sparta and Athens continues to rage. The war, which saw a brief 6 year peace, is now back on after Athens’ bitter defeat in Sicily. The Spartans had sent aid to their allies on the island, but that did not fully satiate their desire for domination.
Sparta wanted to do more … they wanted to destroy Athens.
This brings us to the second segment of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartans still had their secret weapon, Alcibiades, the former Athenian General who was charged with religious crimes. Alcibiades, knowing Athens’ weakest points, convinced Sparta to build a fortification in Decelea, a strategic post right outside of Athens. This would prevent all overland shipment to the Athens, forcing the city to get their supplies by boat, which was much more costly.
This additional expense was then combined with the nearby disrupted silver mines and the 20,000 freed Athenian slaves, resulting in a serious economic crisis for Athens. Their treasury and emergency reserve fund of 1,000 talents was swiftly dwindling away. Their only remaining course of action was to raise taxes or tributes from their allies, which wasn’t a popular decision.
At this point, both parties pumped more troops and ships into Sicily. The Corinthians, the Spartans, and others in the Peloponnesian League all sent reinforcements to Syracuse. The Athenians, however, did not withdrawal. Instead, they brought their own additional men, around 5,000 troops and another hundred ships. It didn’t do the Athenians any good.
The Spartan hero, Gylippus, won all the land wars in Sicily and smartly advised the Syracusans to build a navy, in case the Athenians wanted to escape. Sure enough the Athenians tried and were defeated. Eventually the entire Athenian fleet was destroyed and virtually the whole army sold into slavery.
This was Athens’ lowest moment. Everyone believed her empire was over. Her best men had already died or defected and she was without money, strength or moral. Clearly the Athenians had overestimated their own abilities and were now about to face the truth of their limits.
But Athens didn’t die. Even though her allies revolted against her, the treasuries were empty, and the Syracuences were on the offense with a ship to attack, aided by support in Persia… Athens still had a few things working on her side.
Replica of Athenian ships

Replica of Athenian Ships

For instance, the other side was slow in bringing their ships to the Aegean. Some of their allies returned with hopes of protection and the Persians were slow in furnishing the promised funds. In addition, Athens had a backup plan. In a prudent moment, she had saved some money and 100 ships for a rainy day.
These were immediately released.
With these ships out warring, the Athenian government was taken up by an oligarchical revolution, run by 400 men. Peace was finally possible. The fighting fleets now based on the island of Samos, however, did not recognise the new rulers and the possibility of a ceasefire. In fact, in 411 BC they engaged the Spartans at the famous Battle of Syme. The runaway fleet then appointed Alcibiades as their leader and continued the war until the Athenian democratic government was reinstituted.
Even though Alcibiades was condemned as traitor, he was still influential in Athens. He wanted to restore democracy in a diplomatic manner. So he managed to persuade the renegade ships to not attack Athens, but instead turn their weapons on the Spartans in the battle of Cyzicus. Finally the Athenians had a turning point, they obliterated the Spartan fleet. This helped to re-establish the financial basis of the Athenian Empire.
Between 410 and 406 BC, Athens managed to actually win battles, recover territory and resurrect their fiscal stability. Almost all thanks to Alcibiades.
This happy Athenian moment did not last long.
Though it would not at first appear to be the case, things went back to bad at the naval battle of Arginusae. The Athenians actually won, losing only 25 ships compared to Sparta’s 70. Unfortunately the weather was so bad that the Athenians did not finish off the Spartan fleet, nor rescue their stranded crew. This lead to a very controversial trial which ended with the execution of the Athens’ six top naval commanders. This action depleted the navy’s intelligence, experience and moral.
Lysander of Sparta

Lysander

Then the Spartans promoted a new general, Lysander. He was navy-savvy and a diplomat who cultivated fresh relations with the Persians. In 405 BC, Lysander initiated a cunning attack on Hellespont, the Athenian bread basket, which if destroyed, would threatened widespread starvation.
The Athenian fleet had no choice but to engage in battle and they were crushed.
Eventually, after facing starvation and disease from the never ending siege, Athens surrendered in 404 BC. The defeat was immense. The city was stripped of its walls, its fleet, and all of its overseas possessions. In addition to this, Corinth and Thebes required retribution, demanding that the city be destroyed and all the people enslaved.
Sparta, Athens’ arch-enemy, then did something very remarkable.
Instead of continuing with their warlike ways, Sparta announced their refusal to destroy a city that had previously done so much good. They would take Athens into their own system and ultimately save it from the other city-states, revealing the clemency of the Spartans once and for all.
 
“The Peloponnesian War Summary of Battles and Betrayals: Athens’ Last Stand” was written by Anya Leonard

The Peloponnesian War – The Sicilian Expedition

by September 28, 2017

The Sicilian Expedition
To read the previous segment on the Peloponnesian War, Click HERE.
When we left off last week, the Peloponnesian war had been raging for 16 odd years, with the latter six under a suspicious title of ‘peace’. The dominance of the Athenians had been questioned and the first set of battles ended inconclusively. It’s no wonder then the war began again, this time with the aim of deciding, once and for all, who ruled the Grecian world.
Expedition to Sicily

The Sicilian Expedition

And so, the second part of the Peloponnesian War began after what was euphemistically termed the ‘Sicilian Expedition’. The Sicilians were in fact allies of the Athenians, though very distant. Under normal circumstances, they would probably go unnoticed. And perhaps they would have…except for the fact that these islanders were Ionian, just like the Athenians…and they were under attack by the people of Syracuse, who happened to be ethnic Dorians, just like Athens’ great enemy, Sparta. As a cunning way to get back at their real foe, therefore, the Athenians saw an opportunity to get involved.
Power can be a dangerous thing. Those who hold it, don’t like losing it, and so make decisions that affect the lives of countless others. Seated in their comfortable havens, they command young men to death in the name of gods, kings and country. Along with the fallen soldiers are those whose lands are destroyed, whose sons are subjected to famine, whose wives and daughters are slain. These are the innocents caught in between, the residents of random places, where the strongest states battle for power, seemingly without end…
It is not so different from the United States and Russia battling it out in far flung locations like Vietnam and Korea. These current countries clashed outside their own boundaries, in search for more power without the destruction on their own soil.
Ethnic alliance and wars of opportunity were not the only reasons for the Athenians to sail to Sicily. Another plan was afoot. They wanted to conquer Sicily…to use as a starting point for conquest in Italy and Carthage.
Bust of Alcibiades

Alcibiades

Alcibiades was the Athenian in charge of the expedition and a crucial character from here on out in the Peloponnesian War. Unfortunately, right before the renowned general and his army headed off, some religious statues were damaged, nay mutalitated. Alcibiades was accused. He tried to resolve the issue before leaving for Sicily, knowing that it could take an unfortunate turn if he was not there to defend himself.
But the powers that be forcibly bid him farewell and he took his crew on the perilous journey. Unfortunately, Alcibiades was commanded back for the trial promptly upon arriving on foreign coast. Fearing he would be condemned unjustly, he decided not to return to Athens. Instead Alcibiades defected and went to the Spartan side…taking with him the Athenian designs to take over Sicily.
The Athenians just lost their main player. The trouble, however, did not stop there. Upon landing on the island, the Athenian army made a classic mistake. They weren’t prepared for the winter and, unlike the Spartans, they were unaccustomed to feeling uncomfortable. So they took a break from the weather and tried to conserve their resources.
This gave the Syracusans just enough time to call their Dorian brothers, the Spartans, for help. Sparta was more than happy to lend a hand to spite their former foe… especially knowing from Alcibiades how important the island was in the grand Athenian war strategy. So Sparta sent General Gylippus to Sicily with reinforcements. They swiftly defeated the shivering Athenian forces.
Syracuse coin

Syracusan coin, showing a chariot with maritime symbols, commemorating the naval victory (Bode-Museum, Berlin)

The Athenians did not tuck in their tail and turn. Nicias, our previous Athenian peacemaker, called for reinforcements. These additional armies arrived and vicious battles ensued. Eventually, however, the Athenians realised they had to retreat. They prepared to do so at once, but were stopped in their tracks. A bad omen, a lunar eclipse, took place, and so the Athenians delayed their withdrawal. This moment’s hesitance cost them greatly. The Spartans met their fleeing fleet before they could escape. A huge sea battle raged, and the Athenians were defeated once more. This time all survivors were killed or enslaved.
The war was back on.
 
 

To Read the finale of the Peloponnesian War, Click HERE for “Athens’ Last Stand”.

“The Peloponnesian War – The Sicilian Expedition” was written by Anya Leonard

The Peloponnesian War Summary of Battles and Betrayals – Part Two

by August 11, 2017

The entirety of the Peloponnesian war is broken into two parts, punctuated by a brief, and probably very welcomed, armistice. The total engagement, with all its battles and betrayals, began in 431 BC and finally concluded with complete devestation in 404 BC. The first collection of campaigns, referred to as the “Archidamian War” after the Spartan king, lasted a full ten years.
The Plan of Attack for the land-loving Spartans and their allies was to surround the Athenians, thereby depriving them of their productive fields. This, however, was only partially effective because the Spartans could sustain siege for just a few weeks at a time. The hoplites, or infantrymen, were still farmers after all. They had to return to their own harvest and to quell the occasional slave uprising.
Athenian Strategy

Athenian Strategy

Nonetheless, Pericles, the Atheniangeneral, advised his men to not enter into combat with Sparta’s masterful soldiers on the ground. They would only fail. Instead, the Athenians, far superior in naval warfare, protected the access to their port with a formidable wall and relied on the dominance of their fleet to launch attacks against their enemy. So far, so good.
Bust of Pericles

The Athenian General, Pericles

That’s when the plague hit. Perhaps more than any other factor, it was the sweeping disease that weakened Athens and brought the fair city to her knees. It wiped out over 30,000 citizens, sailors and soldiers, including their revered general and his sons. It is estimated that between one-third to two-thirds of the entire Athenian population perished.
After all the bodies had been disposed of, Athens renewed her military ambitions with emboldened hostility. The general who replaced Pericles, Cleon, embarked on an aggressive strategy for taking down the Spartans. The Athenians continued relentlessly with their naval raids, and stretched their military activities into Boeotia and Aetolia. In addition they began fortifying posts, one of which was near Pylos on a tiny island called Sphacteria. There the course of the first war turned in Athens’s favour.
Finally, things were looking up for Athens. They started taking advantage of Sparta’s greatest weakness: Helots. Helots were essentially slaves that made the Spartan system possible. By doing the farm work, they freed up the citizens’ time to become expert soldiers. However, they were also prone to revolts – and the Athenian presence at nearby posts helped spur them on. Without their working class, Sparta would have a hard time of surviving.
The Athenians rejoiced after the Battle of Pylos in 425, when they defeated the Spartans and captured between 300 and 400 soldiers. However, this joy did not last long. The Spartans fought back with their own belligerent general, Brasidas. He raised an army and took the Athenian silver mines, a crucial source of funding.
Bust of Thucydides

The historian, Thucydides

Interestingly enough, it was Thucydides, the famous historian, who was supposed to have saved the Athenian silver mines. Maybe it’s not so strange then that he said the following: “War is a matter not so much of arms as of money.”
However, Thucydides failed to arrive at the mines in time to defend them and consequently was exiled for his failure. Fortunately for us, this meant he was able to communicate with both sides, gaining a unique perspective which he later recorded in his major work, History of the Peloponnesian War.
The Athenians also knew that silver was pretty key. And so, they tried to retake their productive metallic mines… but, maybe not so tragically, the bellicose generals from both sides, Brasidas and Cleon, were killed in the fight. With no hawkish fame seekers to push the men into action, it was hard to keep warring. In fact, this resulted in the Peace of Nicias, which spanned 6 years.
‘Peace’, however, might be a little bit of an overstatement. There were still plenty skirmishes. Alliances were created and broken and large forces navigated the seas and lands… war was just a shot away.
Click HERE to read about the post peace Grecian breakdown in The Peloponnesian War Summary of Battles and Betrayals – Part Three: The Sicilian Expedition.
“The Peloponnesian War Summary of Battles and Betrayals – Part Two” was written by Anya Leonard