Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father ; and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.
Protagoras ended, and in my ear
So charming left his voice, that I the while
Thought him still speaking ; still stood fixed to hear. At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him : O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither ; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good ; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse ; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask ; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them ; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly ; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer ; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught ; — that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men ; and several times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts ; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing : that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.
There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.
And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face ; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller ?
I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way ; they are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.
And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue ? Of if a man has one part, must he also have all the others ?
By no means, he said ; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.
You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue ?
Most undoubtedly they are, he answered ; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.
And they are all different from one another ? I said.
And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face ; — the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions ; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way ? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions ? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.
Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.
Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness ?
No, he answered.
Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not ? That is my opinion : would it not be yours also ?
Mine also, he said.
And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, “O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just or unjust ?” — and I were to answer, just : would you vote with me or against me ?
With you, he said.
Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just : would not you ?
Yes, he said.
And suppose that he went on to say : “Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness ? “we should answer, “Yes,” if I am not mistaken ?
Yes, he said.
Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing — should we not say so ?
He assented.
“And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy ?” I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, “Peace, man ; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.” What would you say ? Would you not answer in the same way ?
Certainly, he said.
And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, “What were you saying just now ? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another.” I should reply, “You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, by me ; for I only asked the question ; Protagoras gave the answer.” And suppose that he turned to you and said, “Is this true, Protagoras ? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position ?” — how would you answer him ?
I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.
Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this ; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, “Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness ; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy” : how shall we answer him ? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just ; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same ; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice ; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.
He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter ? if you please I please ; and let us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.
Pardon me, I replied ; I do not want this “if you wish” or “if you will” sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven : I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no “if.”
Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing ; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common ; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another ; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.
And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness ?
Certainly not ; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.
Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly ?
I do.
And is not wisdom the. very opposite of folly ?
That is true, he said.
And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate ?
Yes, he said.
And temperance makes them temperate ?
And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate ?
I agree, he said.
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately ?
He assented.
And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance ?
He agreed.
And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness ?
He assented.
And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly ?
He assented again.
And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same ; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite ?
He agreed.
Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful ?
To which the only opposite is the ugly ?
There is no other.
And is there anything good ?
There is.
To which the only opposite is the evil ?
There is no other.
And there is the acute in sound ?
To which the only opposite is the grave ?
There is no other, he said, but that.
Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more ?
He assented.